ósrgnnEICHIsCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN PHILOS OPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLAS SE SITZUNGSBERICHTE, ] 06. BAND Mythisierung der Transzen denz als Entwurf ihrer Erfahrung Arbeitsdokumentation eines Symposiums Herausgegeben von GERHARD OBERHAMMER MARCUS SCHuucrEn VERLAG OBR ÓSIERREICHISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN WIEN ż003 Advaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements as "Mythicising" of Transcendence Halina Marlewicz, Kraków A methodological auto-reflectiott o/'philologv leads to a svstematic p hi lo s o p hi c ą l inv e s ti gatiolt. Hłxs-Gponc GłoAMER Before engaging in the proper theme of this paper, let me start with a few introductory remarks. The paper is concerned with the early Advaita Vedanta hermeneutics of chosen key-statements (mahavalryos) of the Upanisads. In Vedanta, mahdvalqlas were considered the most important part of Vedic revelation.' The task of the key-statements of revelation (die entscheidenden Offenbarungsaussagen) consisted in conveying the truth about the nature of transcendence. In the paper I will try to ręlate the Advaitic hermeneutics to G. OspnHAMMERs idea of "mythicising" the transcendence. References to the notions and formulations of G. OgrnHłMMER hermeneutical reflections will appear throughout the text, but particularly when introducing the conclusive parts of the Advaitic interpretations of revelatory statements. Early Advaita Vedanta hermeneutics of chosen key-statements (lnahavalryo) This part of the article will include a survey of principles that underlie the particular, Advaitic way of interpreting the sense of chosen sayings of the revelation. I will refer here to relevant fragl In this sentence by revelation are meant texts considered to contain and convey the revealed truth. In the following pages, however, the revelation will be mostly taken to have the sense of the very revealed truth, and particularly so in the context of the exegesis. 250 H. Młrupwlcz ments of works of two early Advaitins,, that is of Sankara (tra,Jrtionally dated 788-820 A.D.) and of Sureśvara, Sankara's direc: pupil and follower. I will introduce their interpretation of two lii,lhavakvas namely: "Brahman [is] real, knowledge, infinite"' atlc "You are that".-] These particular sayings, when understood without proper consideration, may seem to speak about the nature of Brahman irl apparently different manners. The first one seems to indicate atl entity characterised by qualities mentioned in the statement. A characterisation leads to a particularisation of the given thing; thus one might conclude from this sentence that Brahman, being unique due to his attributes, is differentiated from other existing things. This conclusion is unacceptable for the Advaitin. The second mahavakya predicates identity of two disparate, as it seems, entities denoted as tat : this (i.e. Brahman) and tvam : you. This identity, one might think, suggests a paradoxical lack of differentiation betweetr the subject and object, which in turn might lead one to conclude that the two particular entities are one and the same. According to the Advaitins the revelatory truth contained in each of these keystatements require considering them from different perspectives, which, in turn, would facilitate arriving at their real, soteriological SenSe. It became necessary, then, to focus on such an explanation of the sense of the above two mahavalq,as,, which would show that they both mediate the experience of the true nature of Brahman as one, single reality without any attributes. This interpretative effort will be illustrated here with the exegesis of the sentences by Sankara and Sureśvara. Yet before undertaking the question of Advaita Vedanta hermeneutics of particular sayings of revelation, I would like to put this hermeneutics in a wider context of its soteriology and epistemology. I hope it is not altogether groundless to indicate a general view of early Advaita on the conditioning under ' TU 2,L: sątl,ąttt jiianaru anąntaln brahłna. 'ChU 6.8,7: tąt tvąm asi. Advaita Ved6nta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 25I which humans being here and now can gain true knowledge of Brahman. One could even say that when considering the Advaitic exegesis it is crucial to always bear in mind the frames within which Advaitins construed their "truth" about the epistemological validity and soteriological meaningfulness of the key-statements (mahavalryos) of revęlation. By epistemological validity of the key-statements, I mean here their functioning within Advaita Vedanta as a proper means to experience the transcendence (-Brahman, ,,das Jenseits des Seienden").a For the Advaitin, revelation (śruti) is the only available means, that allows one to experience the nature of Brahman as being true. This realtzatton is, in itself, a liberating truth the way and means to attain release.The question arises now, how thę mahavalqlas can possibly lead the one, who is searching liberatton (mumuk;u) to experience the nature of Brahman? How does language, be it the language of revelation but having, nevertheless, the status of a phenomenon actualised in a form of a set of objective statements, become the only means to experience Brahman? And can the mumuk;a entrust the śruti statements, which, after all, are the products of nescience (avidya)? Sankara clearly formulates this problem in the following way: "The mutual superimposition of the Self upon the Non-Sell that is, nescience (avidya) is the necessary condition on which are based all worldly practices (vyavahara) regarding means of knowledge (pramalta) and the objects of knowledge Qlrameya), whether they (i.e. praco The notions of "Brahman" and "das Jenseits des Seienden" correspond to one another with regard to, at least, two aspects. Firstly, they both refer to that which is "beyond being", if by this one understands something that transcends the world of here and now. Secondly, as G. OgpnFIłIvlHłpn indicated, both "Brahman" and "das Jenseits des Seienden" are the condition for the consciousness of the subject, As to the functions of both the notions, see also: OsIRHAMMER 2000: 4 fsee p, 13 in this volume]: ,,Wenn ich das ,Jenseits des Seienden' als ,Gott' und ,Vater' oder in der Vedanta-Tradition Indiens als ,Brahman' mythisiere, so verrnittelt diese ,Mythisierung' zwar auch den rationalen Ińalt des sprachlichen Ausdrucks, als ,Mythisierung' des ,Jenseits des Seienden' aber enthżilt sie keine Wahrheit, sondern ist Móglichkeitsgrund seiner mythischen Gegenwart, so daB ich mich zu ihm verhalten, ihm begegnen kann." 252 H. Młruewlcz tices) are of ordinary life or of the Scripture, and [also] scripfural text regarding injunctions, prohibitions, and liberation. "5 With this important, even fundamental presupposition in mind Sankara goes on to explain thę a priori situation which conditions the knowledge of Brahman. At the beginning of any kind of knowledge there is the superimposition (adhyasa), the a priori ot the thought and language process (vyavahara). Subjectivity, in the sense of being the knowing subject, is a necessary and indispensable basis for any kind of cognitive act. It seems to be a matter-offact statement, but often neglected and forgotten when entering into the more and more sophisticated analysis of gaining the knowledge of Brahman in Sankara's teaching. A1l these are factors indispensable of the cognitive act, "because the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there is a knower:, [and] without the employment of the senses, perception and the other fmeans of right knowledge] cannot operate."u And then Sankara concludes the discussion of the factors necessary for the cognitive act to take place by saying: "hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is dependent on nescience."7 The superimposition (adhyasa) of the meanings acquired as a result of the thought and language process (vyavahara) ts a matter of fact and is indistinguishable to the subject who himself exists in this world, as well. Sankara as early as in the commentary to the BSu 1,1 writes about the a priori conditioning of the language of revelation, as well: "Having proved that the object and the subject whose respective fields are the notions of the 'You' and the 'I', the natures of which are opposed to each other as darkness and light are cannot be identified [and that] their ' BSuBh I,I,. tam etam avidvąkhvaln atmdndttnąnor itaretąradhlldsallt puraskytvą salne pl,amaryapramevav))avahdra laukika vaidikaś ca pravyttdh s arv all i c a ś as tr alti v i d hi p r ati s e d h amo kq ap ar dn i. u BSUBh 1.,1 : [...] praruatrvanupapattau pramdryapravyttv anupapattefu. na hlndrivaryv anupadąva pratvak;adi vyavahdrafu sal7lbhavati, ' BSnBh I,I: tąsnlad avidvdvad vi;avanl) eva pratvak;adlni prantaryani śdstrani ca. Advaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 253 properties, as well, cannot be identlcal, it is proper [to say] that the superimposition (adhyasa) of the object whose field is the notion of the 'You' and of the properties of it upon the subject whose self is intelligence, and which has for its sphere the notion of the 'I'and the opposite of that [i.e.]: the superimposition of the properties of the subject to the object is wrong. Still, having superimposed on the one the essence and properties of another [and] having coupled the real and the unreal,, because of the false knowledge of the substrafum of properties and the properties, which are infinitely different ffrom one another], due to not having [them] distinguished mutually, the natural practise of people (lokavyavahara) is such fas to say]: 'I am this, mine is this'."8 A fact to which I would like to draw attention once again is how Sankara explains the original sifuation in which a man can make use of his cognitive power. This situation appears to be the inborn, if one can use such an adjective, commixture of the subject (non-Self), object (Self) and of the essential natures and properties of both, which is acquired in the very act of cognition. One can see from the passage, that the process by which one gets to know the Self ("I") and the Other ("You") as the mixture made up of subjective and objective elements is the natural, inborn epistemological effor of not discerning the (ultimately) real and the unreal. It is so, because man is availed to exercise his cognitive power within the only mode of existence of the material world (vyavaharika). The process of language and thought as described by Sankara inevitably superimposes the objective meanings upon the soteriological sense of śruti. The superimposition (adhyasa) of the mean- * BSnBh I,I: vusłltaclasmatpratvavagocaravor vi;avaviqavinos tąmahprakaśavadvit"uddhąsvabhavayor itaretarabhavanupapattątt siddhavary taddharmaryam api sutaram itąretat,ąbhavdllupapąttir itv ato'smatpratyallagocare vi ; aviryi cidatmake vusmatpratyavagocarasv a vi; avasva tadd harman am ca dhvdsaft, tadvipan,ąyerya visavinas taddharntaryatp ca visąve 'dhvaso mithveti bhąvitum vuktam. tathapv anvonyąsmiłltt anyonydtmąkątdm anvonvądharmdmś cadhvasyetaretarąvivekena, atvantąviviktavor dharmądhąrminor mithvajfiananimittąh satvćinrte mithunih;tva, aham idary mąmedam iti naisargiko' 1l at7l lokawav ąharah. 254 H. Młnlpwlcz ings acquired as a result of the thought and language process (w,rvahara) is a matter of fact and is indistinguishable to the subject who himself exists in this world, as well. Man's basic existential situation both shapes and curbs his cognition, but man, as the "Dasein" cannot realise this fact without the help of śruti.Yet śruti ttself communicates, so to say, mixed-up meanings, because it acquires "worldly" senses due to existing in this world. Discovering the real (i.e. true in the absolute sense) message of revelation has to be interwoven with uncovering the epistemological value of śruri with regard to Brahman by the subject. This can be done only in an act of interi orizing the message of śruti by the subject at the moment when he realises that śruti refers to his own existence and indicates at his basic existential situation. This OgpRHAMMER expresses in the following passage: ,,Damit diese S chltisselaussage n (mahav alq,ani) der Offenbarung jedoch die Transzendenz (: Brahman) in solcher advaitischer Hermeneutik tatsóchlich fiir das Emanzipatton suchende Subjekt evozieren kónnen, diirfte es entscheidend sein, dass ihnen, zufolge der Identitat des transzendenten Seins des Subjektes mit dem transzendenten Brahman, ein echter Realitótsbezug in der Erfahrung des Emanzipation suchenden Subjektes zugrunde liegt, der verhindert, dass diese Aussagen bedeutungsleer werden. Dies wird besonders an Aussagen deutlich wte ,tat tvam asi'9 oder ,aharyl brahma asffii"o , die ohne diesen Realitótsbezug und der in ihnen zum Ausdruck kommenden Identitat des Subjektes mit dem Brahman lediglich leerę Formeln ohne sinntragenden Inhalt wżren (etwa im Sinne von A : A, ohne zu wissen, was A ist) und so nichts evozieren und mythisch in die Gegenwart vermitteln kónnen. Erst wenn in diesem sprachlichen Ausdruck die advaitische Relation des hórenden Subjektes zur transzendenten Wirklichkeit des Brahman implizit vorausgesetzt und mitgeteilt ist, kann er durch die Einbeziehung der transzendenten Realitót des Subjektes, deren wahres Sein eben n ChU 6,8,7. "'BAU I,4,I0. Advaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 255 das Brahman ist, als ,Mythisierung' der Transzendenz dieses in dem einen zweitlosen Brahm an zu sich kommen lassen."|l This is an ultimate act of appropriating the soteriological meaningfulness of śruti, making it one's own, that is: experiencing this sense as the ultimate sense of one's own existence. To this experience, undoubtedly, leads a conscious effort on the part of the mttmukslł. Sankara's understanding of the man's existence inevitably influences his hermeneutics, which fact is perceivable in the important hermeneutical principle underlying his whole exegesis of śruti. It is the principle of epistemological mistake, given the name of the superimposition, which, as an a priori factor, forms the basis of human cognition. This mistake is then mirrored in the wrong understanding of the ultimate sense of the upanigadic statements. If one considers the revelation as simultaneously containing the vyavahdra and paramartha senses a priori "mixed up" and confused, because of the confused situation of the subject,, then one can also understand how the revelation, in spite of it having been conditioned by avidya and in spite of having had superimposed objective meanings, bears within the potency to reveal the nature of Brahman as true. The vyavahara sense of the śruti has to be as if dissolved, so that the real, soteriological sense can shine through. The realtzation of this fact marks the starting point for the exegesis, which is to become the way towards experiencing the transcendent reality as true. This status of śruti creates the basis for its epistemological validity and decides about its potency to unfold its soteriological meaningfulness as well. Man searching liberation can then be guided by the key-statements of revelation, because his understanding of his own existence allows him to presume that all aspects of Advaitic truth are alręady present in it. The highest, ultimate truth, however, is not immediate to the man, but it is there in a potential, latent form. One has to be aware of the fact that linguistic formulations of an idea of the Absolute, be they considered a valid reve- " OnnRHłMMER 2000: 22 |seep. 33 in this volume]. 256 H. Młnlpwrcz lation, are subjected to objectivisation and reification. The knowledge thus gained, as a set of objective statements of facts, necessarily has to undergo a process of interpretation in order to become a "living word" again, and not to lead to the distortion of the actual message of Śruti. Therefore the need arises for a constant effort to overcome the aforernentioned limitations which prevent men from the realizationof the salvific sense of śruti in its fullness. This is how the key-statements (mahaval<yas) of the revelation can be considered to be both valid with regard to the experience of transcendence (Brahman, ,,Jenseits des Seienden"), and meaningful, in the sense of being the instrument of attaining the liberating experience. Guy MłxltrłILIEN has aptly explained these aspects of śruti in the light of Advaita Vedanta: <Elle12 est le seul mode de traduction dans l'ordre de la connaissance objective de ce qui n'est pas un object. [...] Un moyen de manifestation qui se nie soi-meme, de ce qui est par nature Auto-Manifestation directe.>>l3 In Advaita vedanta man has no other means than word to enter the path of experiencing transcendental reality, which reality is beyond the senses and inaccessible through other means of cognition. Close reading and minute analysis of the message of śrttti may lead to the proper grasping of the overall order of reality. It gives that understanding, that is both founded on and legitimised by revelation itself. It is solely revelation, as well, that is capable to express something which is the content inaccessible through other means of cognition due to the simple reason that revelation is conveyed through language and, in fact, is language itself. Precisel_v for the very same reason can language be detached from our ordinary cognition. Due to this power, language, and here it is the language of the revelation, can speak about what is not its objectivised content. It can, therefore, speak about transcendence, though speaking about Brahman is not, obviously, referring to some objec- '' That is śruti, '' MłxltrłILIEN 1975: 18. Advaita Vedanta Hetmeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 257 tively existing designate. In Advaita Vedanta the language of revelation is then this only means, that allows us into the "mythic preSence" of transcendence and makes it possible to experience for us. To conclude for the Advaitin the acfual soteriological meaningfulness of the revelation, which finally results in attaining the liberating experience by the self, seems to be contained in its latent potency to reveal the true reality. One has to bear in mind though, that the liberating experience has to be attained by the very self who searches the liberation. It is no objective fact communicated straightforwardly in the language of revelation. The liberating experience is the effect of the single-aimed effort of one who is intent upon experiencing the truth about Brahman. lt is always undertaken by the self and within the self, and it is prompted by the revelation. This effort, a sine qua rton for approaching Brahman, f€quires, as its basis, a very thorough exegesis of the mahavalqlas, which are the means to this purpose as explained above. Therefore one has to strive constantly and consciously as it seems to overcome the tendency to objectivise the message of the śruti and try to interiorise it. One has to be aware of the a priori conditioning of the revelation, which provides the structural basis for its epistemological validity. The soteriological meaningfulness of śruti, foreshadowed by the objective meanings of words, is not to be read as a simple statement of the truth about Brahman. Still it is this potential revealing power of key-statements, that has to be acfualised by the exegesis that leads one to experience as true the nafure of Brahman. It is the true soteriological value of the mahavalqlas. The true face of what they communicate is for those, who are apt to analyse and properly interpret the objectivised content of these sayings into an immediatę realization of the true nature of Brahman, the non-objectifiable one, attributeless and identical with the transcendent self (atnlan). ż5B H. Młrupwrcz It is then the Advaita Vedanta exeget's task to interpret the nlahavalq,as of the vedantic revelation in such a way that they become fit for revealing the Advaitic mythisation of transcendence (,,das Jenseits des Seienden"). SłNrłna In many of his acknowledged works Sankara scrutinises the true sense of the two mahavalryos chosen for discussion here. I will introduce the interpretation of TU 2,I as found in Sankara's commentary to TU 2,1. As to the second łnahavalq,a contained in ChU 6,8,7 I have chosen its interpretation as found in the verse part, chapter 18, of the Llpadeśasahasrl, which is entitled,. tattvamasiprakara|xan,l. These passages deal with the interpretation of the mention ęd mahavakyas in the most detailed manner. In BSIBh 3,3,1 Sankara has explicitly explained what should be the general approach towards the interpretation of the soteriological sense of śruti (I quote the translation of W. Hłlsrłss): "There cannot be different cognitions relating to the one identical Brahman,, since it cannot be true , that knowledge and its objects are at variance. If, however, many different cognitions conceming the one Brahman were being proposed in different Upanigads, then only one of these could be true, and the others would be effoneous. As a result, there would be a loss of confidence in the TT , 1 ,rl4UpanlSaoS. The possibility, or rather, the danger of understanding those statements of the Upanisads that speak about the nature of Brahman in different manners, is ever present. The above quotation is a clear indication that Sankara is going to contend for showing, by means of his hermeneutics, that all key-statements of the Upani- §ads do and can teach about the one and only reality of Brahman. 'o BSnBh 3,3,1: t,la ca ekal"ilpe brahlnaryv allekarilpa7i vijiiałtdni salnbhavanti. na lly anvąthąrtho 'n.vatlla jiiclnam it.l, ąbhrantaryt bhavati. vatli punar ekąsłnin brahnlalli bahulli viiiianani veddntantal,equ praripipada.vi,yitalli teq dm e kam ab hrąntcun bhrdntani itaranity andŚvas apras an go ved all t equ, Advaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 259 The possibility of different cognitions of Brahman is excluded and shown as groundless, because there cannot be any disp arity between the true knowledge and its object the presence of disparity would show, that thę a priori misunderstanding of the basic existential situation of the self still persist. In tlre perspective of one, uniform cognition of Brahman a|l mallavalqlas should be taken as describing one, unique reality. The division into the so-called nirguna and saguna śruti, t.e. statements respectively describing Brahman as without qualities (nirguna) or as possessed of ceftain attributes, is a result of an unavoidable epistemological mistake contained in deciphering the sense of the revelation within the frames of reality experienced here and now. They are all to be taken to mean one and only, dęvoid of qualities, identical with the Self (atman), reality of Brahman. Tąt tvam asi (ChU 6,8,7) Sankarian hermeneutics of this particular saguna śruti strikes one as following this interpretative process, which can make all seemingly disparate key-statements of the Vedantic revelation lead to a single one, unified, Advaitic type of mythisation. ChU 6,8,7 (i.e.: "You are that"), 3s noted above, seems to be the statement of identity of the Self with transcendence. '' ChU 6,8,7 is treated most extensively by Sankara in his Upadeśasahasrl ("A Thousand Teachings", US). The discussion on the interpretation of thts śrttti is contained in chapter 18. It starts with introducing the opponent's view on the need for prasarykfulana-mędttation and reasoning (vukti) in order to arrive at the salvific sense of the sentence: "Even if it is said: 'You are the only [really] existent', no perrnanent releas e (nluktata) of the Self arises. Therefore the prasarylcaksa-meditation as well as the reasoning (yukti) should be considered."l6 l5 -,, ,'" Vide supra, p. 250. 'Ó US I8,9: sacl eva Naln asit"ll pr as am c ą k5 clm at o vu kty anu c i lt t ąv e t. ukte natntallo łnuktąta sthira, pravartate It is difficult to decide though, what kind 260 H. MłnLEwIcz The prasarylcak;a-meditation and the need for its usage in order to experience the real sense of the ChU 6,B,7 is then discussed in the verses which follow. It is not clear, however, whether Sankara completely disapproves of this method of meditation, or admits the possibility of its application.'' Yet even without any definite answer to the question of whether prasamkhydnA, the synonym of which ts prasarytcak;a, p|ays any role in the process of coming to understanding the salvific sense of this key-statement, it is necessary to see how one should proceed with its interpretation. The method is described in US 18,90 to 93: "When there is no thought: 'I am the freally] existent', fthe sentence] 'You are that' would also be meaningless. This expression will be meaningful to one who has a clear idea about 'You' and 'I'."18 One should not underestimate the importance of this strophe. In the process of coming to understanding the soteriological meanof meditation prasamcaksa was. From the way it is introduced in the verses that follow, it seems that prasalncąksd is somehow equated with pl,asałvkhllana męditation. MłyEDA, in a footnote to this particular verse, stated the following: "As it is clear in the Upad, Śankara rejects prasatnkhydna,but he recommends parisamkhvc\tlą, though how they differ from the former (t.e. prasarytcakqći mentioned in verse 9, H. M.) is not known [...]." '' MłyEpe!992, pp. 197-I98, footnote 13 says that "the word prasam, cakqa is used as a synonym of pl,asamkhyana |...f, In his work Sureśvara makes an opponent define prasarytkhvąllą as 'Mentally going over the meaning of such ślzlri as 'Thou art That' and the reasoning based on the method of agręement and contrariety Nai9(karmyasiddhi) 3,90 [...].' Like Sankara Sureśvara rejects pl"asalnkhvana." This statement of MłYEDł is true only to a certain extęnt. It is Sureśvara himself who says that prasanlkhvana can be accepted as a proper method of realizing the sense of chosen śrmis at an initial stage of the discipline leading to the experience of the Absolute. This is what SureŚvra says in NS 3,124-125: "But if you say that still without prasantkh.valru you cannot sustain fyour] life, we will accept it in fthe discipline, that is]: hearing (śl.avarya) etc. How? Prasarylkllvdlla |occurs] when fsomething is] heard, its [methodic] principle consists in repetition. A man comes to understand after having heard properly what he heard parlially or a bit." (athaivant api prasamkh.vąnam ąntal,ena prandn dharavittttll rla śukno;iti cec chravaryadav eva sary1pądaviqvałnah. (I24) prasarytkhvclltctm śrutdv asva nvavo 'shdmredandtmąkafu t1acchrutary sąmi§,utątlt sąmvak §utvavagacchati. ( 125)) '* US 18,90: sącl aslnlti dhivo'bhdve vllartham svat tat tvam asv api. .vu;madasnladvivekajńe svąd ąrthąvad idałry vacah, Advaita Vedanta Hęrmeneutics of Revelation Key-Statetnents 26l ingfulness of ChU 6,B,,7 an indispensable precondition is the realizatton of the a priori epistemological fault, mentioned by Sankara in BSDBh 1,1.19 It seems to be quite obvious, as well, that "You" and "I" mentioned above refer to the very same existential situation discussed in BhS[Bh l,1. Besides, Sankara indicates quite clearly here that one might approach experiencing the true, soteriological sense of ChU 6,7,8 provided one understands his own existential sifuation: "When there is no thought: 'I am the freally] existent', [the sentence] 'You are that' would also be meaningless." Tlre realizatton of how man's cognition is conditioned and what his primordial existential situation is, leads one to realise another fact, namely: "There is no doubt that what is known as the notions: 'my' and 'this' [refers to] 'You'. [The notion] 'I'would [refer to] both: the very 'I' (asntadl;ta) [and] 'I am this (al,anl asnli)' ."20 This strophe reminds one again of the examples used in BhSuBh 1.'l "I am this" and "mine is this" that serve as examples to show how the superimposition of the non-Self and Self and their properties upon one another takes place. It seems that in the context of discussion ChU 6,J,B, as well, Sankara points to the necessity of making a clear-cut distinction between the actual sense of the word, which refers to the object, i.e. everything that is non-Self and the self, which is the object of cognition. But the sense of the word "I" presupposes the awareness of the a priori existential situation of the subject and his awareness of his very self. Then another step of this hermeneutical process is stated: "With regard to one another, for them [namely the notions from verse 9I,f a relation of principal and subordinate (pradhanagunata) is wished for, and also a relation of determinans-determinandum (vnes ana-viśesyatva) should be understood rationall y."" l9 -,. ,' ' Vidc supra. p.252-253. '" US 18,91: mąmeclctfilpl,ah)a))att jiie.vart .l,rt§łnctcb, eva na a h am i t_l, cts nl adi Ę t ąh s.l, ctd ą.v aln ą s łtti t i c o b h av o h. '' US |8,92: an1,onyclpek;allĘ tesdm pl,adhatlagttnatesvate. sesvatvant tatha gl"ahvam hi vuktitąh. samśąvah, viśesanavi262 H. Młnlpwlcz The assumption here seems to be, that the notions "mine, this" (the non-Self) and "I" (the Self : dtnrun) refer to one and the same object, and that they are co-ordinated as determinans-determinandum when one considers them logically and rationally. This logical consideration is then explained in US l8,96: "For here, in 'I', it is the reasoning (s,ukti) by co-presence and co-absence (anvaya-watireka)22 for the words and the word-objects, that there would be an accurate determination."23 It is only in stanzas 18,175-176 that we get a more definite explanation of anvava-vyatireka method of reasoning. "In case of Veda there is no such a rule [as]: 'in the sentence this word should be the first one and this word should be the following one.' The syntactical order of words [follows] from the sense [of the sentence]. For, in case of the sentence,, there is the remembrance of the meanings of words which are heard by fmeans of the reasoning] anvavą-vyatireka and then fthere arises] understanding of the sense of the sentence."24 One understands now that the anvaya-vyatireka method is connected to the preliminary stage of understanding the structure of ordinarily used language, and this is underlined by Sankara himself in US 18,178. This stage is necessary insofar as it lets one understand the functions of words and word-meanings in the sentence in order to make a meaningful unit out of a string of words. "In the sentences such as'you are that', the sense of the sentence'I am the ever-liberated' will not be clarified, unless from the clear discrimination of the meaning of the word 'you' the sense 'I am ever liberated' fis acquired]."25 2' Vide infra, p.268. 23 US 18,96: arlvt.vłv.\,atirekatt lli paclarthąs.l,ą padasva ca. s_y,ącl etcttl ąham ity orrn vuktir ey,avadhal,ąne. 'o US 18,175-176: icląryt pl-llnaln iclcąt paścat paclalp vakve bhavetl iti, ttivąttto ltąiva y,ede'sti padasarygat.l)am arthatafu (l75). vdkye hi śr[|vantdnant padandm al,thctsanlsml,tift, anvąvąvvatirekabhvary tato vdh,drthabodhlł,ląllt (176) '-' US 18,179: tatvąnrusyąclivdh,estt tvarytpaclarthclvivekataĘ, vllaj.vate naivą vakvdrtho nitvąnrukto 'ham ity ą7o1r. Advaita Vedanta Hetmeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 263 In the next stanza Sankara lays emphasis on the fact that the ratio is to be utilised in order to distinguish the sense of the word "you" (non-Self) from the Self clearly.2u With this function of the rational analysis of the sentence-sense fulfilled, one shifts from rational to soteriological meaningfulness of ChU 6,8,'7. This is the most important, as well as the most interesting moment in the interpretation of this śruti. This is the moment of the breakthrough from the ordinary sense to the salvific meaningfulness of the keystatement. This moment is shown as the culmination of the whole exegesis of ChU 6,8,7. "The meaning of this sentence becomes clear in the following way: The unique (kevala) 'I' is the meaning of the word, because by removing (apoha) the meaning 'the sufferer', the innermost self Qlratl,agatma) is ascertained,."27 I think the wlrole discussion on experiencing the true,, salvific sense of this key-statement is best summarised by G. OBInHłMMER. Though the following quotation occurs in the work in which OgpnFIłMMER analyses Śankara's understanding of arutbhava, the conclusions drawn there are suitable for our discussion as well: ([...] il devient clair que l'identite de l'Atman et du Brahman, [...] ne signifie pas quelque identification de deux entitós differentes en une connaissance concepfuelle et par suite qu'elle n'est aucunement un contenu d'une <connaissance de quelque chose>. Elle signifie simplement que le sujet de l'experience se transcende soi-meme dans cette experience vers un <au-deld de l'ćtant>, qui vient ainsi s'inscrire dans l'expćrience, en dehors de (tout ćlóment) second.>>" And, finally: ([...] le sujet prend conscience de lui-mćme comme 6tman (Brahman), sans concepts ni irnages objectivants, par la seul comprĆhension des ćnonces de la Sruti. La validitć de ce (prendre conscience> rósulte du fait que la realite móme, attribuóe au sujet parla Śruti, se fait consciente en lui comme telle.>>29 ](l , ,, ,-'' Vide supra, p. 252: BhSnBh 1,1. " US 18,18I: vdlą,dł,tho vvajvate caivąm kevalo 'hałnpaclclrthaft. cllthkhih, etacl apohena pl,atvagatmaviiiśca.l,at. '8 OSERułMMER 1994:23. 'n OgeRHłMMER 1994:2I. 264 H. Meruewlcz Satyary jfranam anantam brahma (TU 2,1) In this part the exegesis of TU 2,1 śruti: "Brahman [is] real' knowledge, infinite" will be introduced. This is apparently a śruti that describes transcendence as possesing of the above-enumerated attributes. Sankara's interpretation of this sentence is to be found in his commentary to this Upanigad entitled Taittiriyopanisadbhał1,a (TUBh). While interpreting this passage, Sankara seems to concentrate on two issues: the notion of sanlanadhikaranya (approximately coreference) and the question of the viśesarya-viśesvla relatton (i.e. the relation of determinans-deterrninandum) between terms in a sentence. Sanlanadhikara7ya is the notion of linguistic provenance. It was used as early as by Panini. It has been defined only in the seventh century AD in the Kaśikavrtti by Vamana and Jayaditya in the commentary upon sDtra 2,7,19. There it is stated: "Sdnlanadhikararlya is the functioning of the word having different causes for its application with regard to one sense (or: object)."3o In this definition samanadhikąrarlya ls taken to mean the coreferrence of two members of a Tatpurusa-Karm adharaya compound to one object, and is not related to the sense of the sentence, but only to the sense of a compound word. But in the discussed PaSSage from TU 2,I samanadhikaranya ts the intra-linguistic relation among words that decides that words having one and the same case ending and put next to one another refer to a single designate. The viŚesana-viśe$ya relation is, most generally, the relation between something to be determined (viśeg a) and some determining factors. In linguistics it is taken to express the relation between a substantive and adjective(r).'' }() ,.-.., -'"' KąŚikąvrtti (: KV) ad 2,I,49: bhinnapl"ttvrttiltilltittasvcl śabdasvctikasminn ąrtlte vruiń samąllącl hikąraltvam. 3' Katyayana, commenting upon Panini 2,I,5'7, states bheclakalrl viśesctnam bhedvam viŚesvąllt'. "The attributive adjunct (viśesaryalll) is the determining factor and the subject (viśesvam) is the thing to be detetmine,d." Advaita Vedanta Hetmeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 265 These two notions, i.e. the relation of viśesya-viśesana and samanadhikaranya seem to be the most important factors in tlre analysis of the sense of TU 2,1 by Sankara. He states: "The sentence: 'Brahman [is] real, knowledge, infinite' expresses the sense of a definition [or: indication] of Brahman. Therefore the three words: 'real, (satya) etc.' referring to attributes (vrsesanas), have Brahman as the thing to be determined (viśesya). t...] Only due to the relation of determinans-determinandum (viśe sana-viśesyatva), the words: 'real (saĄla) etc.'[which have] one case ending, are in the state of co-reference (samanadhikaranva). Brahman, which is determined by the three determining terms i.e. 'real etc.', is differentiated from other things to be determined.'o32 An interesting element in the interpretation of TU 2,1 is the fact that Sankara mentions the relation of determination (viśesanaviśesvatva). It becomes clear very soon, that this relation is conceived of in a peculiar way. Immediately after the short exposition of his preliminary thesis, Sankara goes on to discuss the relation of determinans-determinandum (viŚesana-viśesyatva). He concentrates exclusively on explaining this relation. Further in the same passage the opponent in the discussion indicates a fault in Sankara's reasoning. The opponent states that no other Brahman exist from which one could differentiate (this) Brahman. Thus one cannot delimit its realm in such a way as one does when distinguishing, for example, individuals of one species by means of indicating that one individual of the species possesses ceftain attributes which are absent in another individual of the same species. The opponent indicates that this cannot be the right procedure in the case of Brahman, which is one and only. Sankara refutes this reasoning by trying to prove that in this particular sen- " TUBh, p. 443: satvam jficlnam ąnctntąm brahmeti brahmctno ląksanc1rthaft valryam. sąh:adini hi tl,ilti viśesanarthani paddni viśe1vas.va brahntąnah. [...J viŚe;cmaviŚeq.l,ąt,-ad eva sctt.l,adin.t, ekatibhakt.vcutani paclani salnanadliikcu'anąni...sat.l,ądibhis tribhil, viśesaryair viśesvanldltctlłt brcthnlą viśesvalftcu-ebh1,o nirdhal"vate. 266 H. Młrupwrcz tence: "Determining terms (viśesarya) have the sense of the definiens (or: indicators lakłalta).|...] Determining terms (viśesana) primarily express the sense of the definition of Brahman and they do not primarilv [convey the sense ofl attributes."33 The adjectives "real, etc." used in the śruti discussed do not refer to attributes. They are used here to serve one, particular purpose: to define the one and only thing (Brahman) and to indicate it. How it is done by means of these words, is explained by Sankara later in the passage. At this point Sankara explains the difference between the relation of the definiens-definiendum and determinans-determinandum: "Determining terms (viśeyarya) [related to the given] to be determined substrafum (l,iśesya) exclude fthis to be determined substratum] only from [other things] of the same genus, but the definition (or: indication lak;arya) excludes fthe to be defined thing] from everything else [...] Words satvant etc., are not mutually connected with one another, due to the rule of 'referring to another',, thus they refer to the to be determined substratum."34 The rule hinted at by Sankara in the above quotation is the Mimamsa rule contained in Jaimini-Sfitra: "And the qualities, due to [their] being subservient to other [things],, are not related to one another because of ftheir] equality."" Eventually Sankara clearly describes the function of TlJ 2,I in which the three words satya, etc. relate to the substratum to be determined in such a way that they define it by excluding it from everything which is non-Brahman: "In [the sentence] 'Brahman is real...' fBrahman is only] indicated with the word'real', the subject of which [word] is some general notion (samanya resem- " TUBh, p. 444: lak;allarthątvatl viśesanaltam. [...J lak;a7ldrthapradhdnąni viśesanani na viśesaryapradhclllallv eva. 'o TUBh, p. 444: salnanajdti.vebhva eva nivartakdni viśeqaryal,ti viśe;vasva lakqa4tam ttt sąl-vątct eva. [...J satvadiśabdc7 na parasparam sambadhvante pal,arthatvdd tiśe§yarthą hi te. ątą ekaiko viśe;aryaśabdah pąrasparam nirapekq o brahmaś ctbd ena sambąd hvate. " JSD 3,I,2ż: gunanćiltt ca pararthatvclcl asalllbanclhaĄ salnaNdt svdt. Advaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 267 blance?) of external reality (bahyasatta). Rut Brahman is not denoted only with the word'real'. In this wźly, the words: 'real etc.'put together with one another (itaretara-samnidha) fand at one time] being for one another the limiting factors and [at the other] the thing limited, exclude it [i.e. Brahman] from being directly expressed by the words 'real etc.' fThese words] become fthen] fit for expressing the sense of the definition of Brahman."3Ó As it now can be seen, the whole discussion on the process of the acquisition of the true sense of TU 2,1 is dominated by a specific approach to its function. Step by step Sankara strives to prove that this śrtłti should not be taken to describe Brahman as a being determined by qualities, because Brahman is a single, undetermined reality. At first, the linguistic interpretation of the mufual syntactical and semantic relations (which are samanadhikaranya and viśeqarya-viśe$ya) among words in the sentence imposes the structure of an apparent relation of dependence on us. That is: one notices that there is the governing element to be determined and at the same time the determining governed elements (viśe;ya-viśe;ana). Recognising this relation is unavoidable inasmuch as it lets us differentiate among the governed and governing elements in a unit of speech in which there is no copula and in which all words have the same case-ending (saruanadhikaranapada). It is a basic, though only an initial procedure in approaching a proper, soteriological sense of TU 2,1. Due to this step one is able to see the structure of a sentence and the syntactic-semantic function of words constituting it. The viśesya-word governs the case ending of the viśe;arya-words, and thanks to it these words can be taken to create a meaningful unit and refer to a single subject matter (samdnadhikaranapada). Yet it would be an exegetical so to say mistake to restrict the function of the vlses ana-viśesva ręlation in the case of the śrrlti 'o TUBh, p. 452: bdh.vasctttąsalnanl,ąl,isal,erya sat.vaśąbclena lak;vate sltvlltl bt"ahmeti na tu satvaśabdat,dcvant eva bl,ahly,la. evam satvcjdiśabda itaretal,asamnidhav ąllr,ol,t.vallivam.vanivąmakąh santah sątvcldiśctbdąvącvat tcut ltivartttkći brahlnQno lakscmarthaś cą bhavalltitl,. 268 H. Merupwlcz from TU 2,1 only to the relation of the determinans-determinandum. By doing so one would also show that one does not realise the fact that śruti, existing in the empirical world of our "Da-sein" is, in fact, embedded in the vyavaharika order of things. In order to make it yield a true sense, one has to as if see through the symbolisation of Brahman by means of the language,, to let the light of Brahman reality shine through the words. This seems to be suggested by the statement that "Brahman cannot be directly expressed and cannot be the object of the sentence similar to [things] like 'blue lotus'."37 Yet one cannot simply overlook the fact that these particular words with their particular meanings are the sentence-constituents. Therefore the next step should be to state precisely the revelatory function of the viśesałla-words. Obviously one can not take them to convey the sense of attributes for reasons already mentioned above. By excluding everything from Brahman's nature which is non-Brahman they indicate the "that-ness" of Brahman, its haecceitas. Yet this is not the only function they have to fulfil here, as one could say that the haecceitas of a thing can be expressed by simply naming it. One could, in this case, state as much as "Brahman is Brahman", which would be approximate to Gp,nrRUDE STEIN's famous: "a rose is a rose iS a rose". The viśe§aryas also serve as those indispensable elements in that sentence that indicate the "such-ness" quidditas, the true essence (svarilpa) of Brahman. Their relation with the word Brahman seems to be such that they precisely delimit the realm of Brahman, without the apparent imposition of the usual,, attributive function of the viśesarya-words. The word "real" excludes the fact, that Brahman is "unreal". Similarly the word "Brahman" excludes the fact that "non-Brahman" is real. Such an interpretation of the viŚe;ya-viśesana relation reminds us of a specific method of infer- " TUBh, p.452: avacyatvam nilotpaląvac! ąvąkvąrthątvam ca brahmąnah, Advaita Vedanta Hertneneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 269 ential reasoning of Sankara known as anvaya-vyatireka as mentioned above. Anvava-vyatireka can be explained as an inferential reasoning, which, by indicating at a combination of concomitant presences and concomitant absences may be used to support claims of identity and mutual reducibility of some relata.38 Let me now apply this method to the interpretation of the mahavalcva from TU 2,1. The word "Brahman" used in this statement requires the invariable presence of the word "saĄ/A", because if there is a reality of Brahman, it is the only true one (satyary brahma).This step of anvaya, that is of concomitant presence of Brahman and the real, both in the intra-linguistic sentence-situation and extra-linguistic rea|tty, is proven by concomitant absences. That is, if there is a non-Brahman, it is at the same time unreal (anyta). This seems to be the way by which Sankara proceeds to explain the function of attributive adjuncts of thts śruti and the ultimate function of those words that lead to the rea|tzatton of Brahman as such, and not to the reality of it as possessed of attributes. Words with arl apparently attributive sense both delimit the realm of one undifferentiated thing as such (brahmasvarupa) and do not superimpose any attributes upon it. This is an important moment in Sankara's hermeneutics of TU 2,1. k is thus shown that this mahavdkya ls not meant to show what Brahman is like but what it is not. In this way Sankara shows that the apparent relation of viśe;ya-viśe- §a7a, which at first is a superimposed mythicising ("Mythisierung") of transcendence, is also as a reality possessed of attributes to be excluded. The above-shown method of the analysis of the function of particular words of TU 2,L mahavolrya allows one to reach, in the final step, the final, soteriological meaningfulness of this key-statement of the Veddntic revelation. If one interprets the 38 In the description of the function of anvavct-vvatireką I follow HłLspłss 199I, p. 170, When writing about the state of research on anvava-v.vatirekąHłI-BFASS does not mention MłxllłIt-IpN 1975. MłxIMILIEN in his introduction to the translation of Nai9karmyasiddhi by Sureśvara writes on pp. 7-8: <L'outil intellectuel de l'operation est une forrne de raisonnement inferentiel appelee anvayavyatireka, (raisonnement par) co-prósence et co-absence.>> 270 H. Młnlpwrcz relation of viŚesya-viśesałlą lnthe above way, it becomes clear that one must exclude the lirrguistic relation of noun-attributive adjuncts or semantic-logical relation of subject and predicates, as they could then lead one to assume that this sentence intends to communicate the extra-linguistic relation of determinans-determinandum . Sanlanadhikarana and the viśesya-viśesana relation do not function here strictly as a linguistic notion, though applied, on the surface of it, to solve some semantic and syntactical questions. Linguistic and logical questions evoked by the particular structure of the sentence in which words are in apposition and co-related as "determinans-determinandum" subserve a different purpose here. Linguistic and logical notions (sanlanadhikaranya, viśesya-viśe;ana) are aptly used here to de-construct the syntactic structure and the meaning of the sentence in order to eventually show that the ordinary grammar of the ordinarily used language relates only to the ordinarily experienced reality. It is a necessary step, but is to be discarded in the very moment in which the realization of the true and only purport of the sentence arises, which is the essence (svarupa) of Brahman. The words function exclusively in the relation of laksyą-laksana and the analysis of the way they define Brahman's nature leads to another conclusion: these words cannot directly denote Brahman, they can only indicate (or perhaps evoke?) it. Sankara strives to prove that by this de-construction of the apparent sense of Śruti statements one can come to the ręalization of the truth about the transcendence. This process of de-construction makes one slowly come to know the true nature of the reality described by the sentence. The moment in which this particular keystatement unfolds its salvific meaningfulness is precisely the moment that allows one, in G. OspnHłMMERs words, into the "mythic presence" of transcendence. It is also this moment that makes transcendence experiencable to the Self. Maybe it also allows the Self to experience its own transcendental dimension. Yet this also seems to be the moment in which words with their many-faceted meanings are no longer necessary, being foreshadowed by the Advaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 27I immediateness of the "mythic presence" of transcendence. It seems to be quite easily discernible that both in Sankara and G. OspnHAMMER's thought, the role of the language in the process of bringing in the "mythic presence" of transcendence is not to be un_ derestimated. Language, be it an ordinarily used system of mean_ ingful signs or the language of revelation, is the instrument which makes that which is not an object of cognition experiencable to the Self. The overall process of the acquisition of soteriological meaningfulness of the revelatory key-statement present in the hermeneutics of Sankara, based on his idea of the "One Reality" of Brahman reminds us about the conditioning of the "mythisation of transcendence" which G. OnpnHłMMER writes about. The one and undifferentiated Brahman of Sankara seems to be this "mythic presence" of transcendence ręaltzed by means of the language: ,,Mythisch wóre demnach die Wirklichkeit nicht insofern iiber sie geredet wird, sondern sofern sie das flir den Menschen in Sprache und durch Sprache Wirklichkeit gewordene Sein selbst in Einzelnen und im Ganzenist."39 It seems to be quite obvious when interpreting the sense of TIJ 2,1, Sankara strives to de-mythicise this particular mythisation of transcendence as a reality with particular attributes. Yet his hermeneutical effort to de-mythicise the reality described by TU 2,L leads to another mythisation. It is unavoidable inasmuch as the mythisation can be meanigful only under the condition that it is contained within the framework of the experience of transcendence as it is present in a particular religious tradition. This OBPRHłMMER expresses in the following words: ,,Will man aber einę solche Annahme nicht machen, so kónnte es nur einen etnzigen Grund fiir die nachtrógliche unterschiedliche Verbalisierung geben: clie jeweils andere Erfahrun g, derzlfolge auch die Verbalisierung eine andere sein muB, wann immer es einen Zusammenhang zwischen Erfahrung und nachtróglicher Verbalisierung geben soll; selbst wenn dieser Zusammenhang nur darin bęsttinde, daB die Transzen- 'n OgpRHłMMER 1987: 30. 272 H. Młrupwrcz dęnzerfahrung in einem religiósen Glauben ermóglichende ,,Mythisierung' des ,Jenseits des Seienden' tatsóchlich nt einer Erfahrunq fiihrt und die ,Mythisierung' durch diese Erfahrung nicht autgehoben, sondern von ihr zur geistigen Realitót gebracht wird."aO SuRpsvłRł Sureśvara (ca B50 900 AD), the pupil of Sankara and his follower, deals with the interpretation of TU 2,1 tnhts Taittirivaval.ttika, a commentary on TaittirĄ,opanisad. His method of interpreting śruti has already been described by Hłcrcpno', MAxIMILIEN". and MłyEDło'. To my knowledge HłcrER was the first to introduce the interpretation of ChU 6,8,7: tat tvanl asi andto notice and enumerate what constituted the peculiar character of this interpretation. HłCrpn introduces succeeding steps in the interpretation of SureŚvara, indicating at first, just as Sureśvara himself, the intellectual level of understanding the meaning of the "Great Saying"'. At this stage Hłcrpn specifies characteristic components of sucir an understanding. They arę anvaya-vllatireka methodao, ,or.,rn,.łao', anyon})a-niyamya-nivantakatd6 . These components, co-opero" OgpRHłMMER 1987:29. o' Hłcrpn 195 1. parlicularly p. 73-79, " MłxIvILIEN Ig75,particularly introduction, pp. 7-13. o3 Młypoł 1980-81. oo Hłcnpn 195 I. Atlllava-vvatil"eka is defined by HłcrER on p.74 in the following manner: ,,Das Versttindnis des heiligen Satzes geht aus vonl Versttindnis der Wórter, die ihn konstituieręn. Man erreicht es durch die lo_eische Methode des Anvaya und Vyatireka, d,h. durch Reflexion dariiber, da13 der Inhalt der Wórler und des Satzes wohlbegriindet und das Gegenteil logisch unmóglich ist." o' Hłct<Pn 195 I, p.75, on which one can find a translation of NS III.9.: ,,Jeder satz, sei er weltlich oder vedisch, macht nur insofern einen satzinhalt verstóndlich, als dieser in einer Vereinigung (sttmsalga) besteht"' and p. 76: ,,Dagegen ist hinreichęnd klar. daB Sureśvara unter der ,Vereinigung' eine Art Sinnverschmelzung von Subject und Priidikat verstand." ou HecrEn 195I:76, a translation of NS 3,2: ,,Wie im Falle der Begriffe ,blau' und ,Lotus' wird durch die beiden (Worte tąt und Nam) zweierleiausAdvaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 273 ating in order to lead to a logically accurate understanding of the sense of ChU 6,8,7, concur in the initial stage of the sense-acquisition. This stage, though an indispensable one, prepares the reader / hearer for the next, much more important stage, that is, the understanding which comprises the actual, revealed sense of the śruti (śravana) with regard to the true nafure of Brahman. At this stage Sureśvara laid out the following, indispensable constituents of his method: samanadhikaranya, viśesa4a-viśe;ya-bhava and lak7yalaksarya-sambandha.a7 MłxtlłtLIEN, in the introduction to his translation of the Nai;karnlyasiddhi, has made a few interesting remarks concerning the exegetical method of Sureśvara. MłxIMILIEN indicates its connection to the exegesis of P[rva-Mimarysa and shows its connection to the method of the analysis and interpretation of TU 2,1 by Sureśvara.a' When Młypoł treats the same subject that HłCKER did before, he does not differ much in his conclusiorrson when tracing out the successive steps of interpreting ChU 6,8,7 by Sureśvara. Młypnł points out that Sureśvara's merit lies in the point that "he gave specific technical terms to, and clearly formulated the threefold relation among words, word meanings, and the Inner-dtman"S0 geschlossen, ndmlich das Leidvollsein und das Nichtatmansein [...] Nach Jfranottamas Erklórung ist in dem Beispiel die AusschlieBung oder gegenseitige Einschrónkung (anvonva-ni.vąmva-niyfipn1oota) von Subject und Prżidikat so zu verstehen, daB in dem Satze ,Der Lotus ist blau' durch die Bęstirnmung ,blau' alles Nichtblaue von dem Lotus, und durch die Bestimmung ,Lotus' alles, was Nicht-Lotus ist, von dem Blauen ausgeschlossen wird." o' Hłcrpn 195I: 77:,,Im heiligen Satze besteht zwischen den beiden Wórtern tąt und tvąm die Beziehung der grammatischen Koordination (samanadhikararyya), zwischen beiden Wor1-Inhalten (padartha) die des Spezifizierenden zum Spezifizierten (viśeqarya-viśe;va-bhava) und zwischen den Wortinhalten einerseits und dem satzinhalt andererseits die des anndhernd lndizierenden zum annahernd Indizierte n (l ą k; v a l ak ; ary a s anl b an d h a III. 3 ). " o* MłxIxłILIEN I975:12, footnote 2, in which he points out that TV 2.1, verses 44-100, comprise a method of interpreting TU 2,1, which is very much similar to the method of interpreting ChU 6,8,7. o9 See: Hłcren 1951: 75-77 and Młypuł 1982: 150-159. 5" MłyEoł 1980-1981: 160. 2]4 H. Młrupwlcz to the Sankarian exegesis of this particular "Great Saying". As MłxtHłtLIEN has rightly pointed out, the exegesis of TU 6,8,7 does not seem to be different from the interpretation of TU 2,1. After these remarks showing a history of the research on Sureśvara's exegesis of śrutiTU 2,1, let me now shift to the description of this method as seen in the Tv of sureśvara. Sureśvara, Śankara's pupil included in his exegesis of TIJ 2,1 the same interpretative model of his teacher and in addition pryvided a precise methodology.'' It seems unnecessary to repeat here all the successive steps in the intellectual cognition of the meaning of TU 2,1, as the authors of the studies mentioned above have already explained it. łlthough Sureśvara does not straightforwardly mention, that in order to properly analyse the sense of TU 2,1 one has to apply the same method as in the interpretation of ChU 6,8,7, a close reading of the relevant fragment of TV makes the parallels easily recognisable. For our purposes it is then enough to remember the steps in approaching a proper understanding of the meaning of ChU 6,8,7 as described by HłcrER.52 Let us see then whether our supposition with regard to the similarities in the approach to the understanding of both TTJ ż,l and ChU 6,B,7 are eligible. In the successive verses Sureśvara indicates that the four words used in the TU 2,1 mahavolrya are related as determinans-determinandum (viśesa7ta-viśe;yatva), and that they all have one and the same declension ending.s' It is interesting to notice that he stresses the fact that Brahman is the main (pradhanva) word in the sentence and is to be understood as the determinandum (viśesya). The remaining words are the determinants (vls eĘaua).'o Further he mentions the condition of congruence, which he '' Cf, NS 3,3. _5].,. ,,'Vide supra. footnote 46. " TV I,47: viśesanaviśesyatvąt sat.vądinv ctta eva ca catvarv ekavillhaktini [...J. " TV I,48: veclvatvena vato brąhma prdclhut.veną vivaksitaryt, tasmclcl viŚesvąllt vijiiet,am tato' nvat s.vąd viŚesąnam. Advaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 27 5 explains as ekadhikaranva, a synonym of sanlanadltikąran_ya. Next he explains the functioning of a congruent sentence, bringing the example already known from Sankara, the "blue, big, sweet-smelling lotus".55 The same examplificatory sentence, which in everyday usage illustrates the mundane way of coming to understand the actual content of the sentence by differentiating the lotus with the given determining terms from other individual representatives of the same kind of flower, is used in the next verse. Here Sureśvara defines the function of the determinans (viśesana) tn the "Great Saying" of the TU 2,1 as being those constifuents of the sentence that allow the differentiation Brahman from all this, which is nonBrahman.'u The function of the attributive adjuncts is then to differentiate things of the same species that are furnished with different attributes from one another. In the case of Brahman this manner of understanding the function of words that are taken to be attributive adjuncts fails, as there are no other Brahmans from which this one can be differentiated.s7 Therefore one has to understand the relation between the terms in the sentence in a different way: as the relation of lak;ya-lak;ana, deftniendum-definiens.'* In this relation words that function as attributive adjuncts are, independently from one another, co-ordinated syntactically and semantically with the object to be determined (viśe;ya).'n A conclusive step in Sureśara's procedure of interpreting TU 2,1 is to state clearly that the viśesałla-words function in this sentence only as "indications" (or perhaps: evocators) of Brahman they do not name it directly. Even though they do not give up their meanings as attri- '-' TV I,46: nilaltt tnahat sttgaltclhiti viśis.vany,tttpalaryt vathd, ekącthikardn.|l evant satlladini parary mąhat, 'u TV 1,51: 1.. J taj jiiatam 1,acl anl,ebh.vo'vaclhalryate. tlilotpatactivact bł,ahłna nanvathcl [.,,J . 57 TV I,52: l,t,abhiccu"aclvąsttt s.vacl t,iśe$,ąl?l viśesanąilt, bl,ahmdlltarad rte tv ątra kuto brilhi viśes.l,atc7. " TV I,53: lak;_l,ctląksąl]atam _vatu ną closo 'tra tnaltag api. 'n TV 1,58: salyćiclal,afu pardrtltatvacl itaretaranisą"hdh, ekaikąs tv ata ev ąi Ę ary vi ś e;v arth e n a bad hvąte. 276 H. MeruEwICz butive adjuncts, they still do not detetmine Brahman, but only indicate it by excluding everything that is non-Brahman from it.60 It is quite discernible now that Sureśvara closely follows his teacher when it comes to the method of interpreting TIJ 2,1. His contribution basically seems to be contained in providing a structure to Śankara's method by systematising it. It is worthwhite noticing that, strangely enough, Sureśvara does not insist that viśesalta words reject their attributive sense. An interesting tratt of both Sankara's and SureŚvara's interpretation of TU 2,I ts the fact, that neither of them speak about the necessity to introduce the function of laksana-sęcondary, contextual and indirect sense of words, which later became a must in the Advaitic exegesis of salnanadhikaranya sentences, beginning with SarvajfrEtman. Yet it is only SureŚvara's hermeneutic which clearly indicates that the exegesis of ChU 6,7,8 should become a sort of paradigm for the Advaitic interpretation of all key-statements that are congruent (samanadhikarallya) and seem to describe Brahman as a determined being. Both the tension and the intensity between the linguistic description and that which it refers to is produced in the process of analysis of the real meaning of the saying of the revelation. The process, involving etymology and logic, reasoning and intuition, all applied within the limits of one's own religious tradition, eventually leads one to the conclusion that language indicates the reality of Brahman without naming it. It is exclusively the content, which is beyond ordinary word meanings, as if absent at first sight, that gives the ultimate salvific meaningfulness to the statements of the revelation. This transcendent reality flows through the word and in this way only due to and by means of the language this unnamed yet indicated reality becomes approachable to those searching for liberation. The capacity of the key-statements to let the "Jenseits des Seienden" become approachable is equal to its sou" See: TV 1,100: pratvakh.vątakhilanątmąbhedąsatvarthąl,acilld tąthaiva satvąŚabdeną laksvate, tan na tucvate. TV 1,101: evąłtr satvadavah śabctah svarthąsąlntvaginaĄ paranx lakqavati viruddhdrthanivrttva 'jiidnahdllatah. Advaita Vedanta Hermeneutics of Revelation Key-Statements 277 teriological meaningfulness. In this way they become a proper instrument to attain liberation. The hermeneutics of both the TU 2,1, "Brahman is real, knowledge, infinity", which, when considered on the ordinary level of its meaning, seems to communicate transcendence as possessed of attributes and the hermeneutics of ChU 6,B,J, which proclaims identity of the Inner Atman with Brahman, are strange as it might seem at first sight proclaiming the same kind of being. The process of interpretation makes all seemingly disparate keystatements of the Indian Revelation lead to a single type of mythisation. Whether a mahavalrya seems to speak about a qualified BrahmaĄ or one, attributeless Brahman, whether it seems to indicate the identity of the Self (Atman) with transcendence (Brahman), it is always aiming at indicating one and the same "mythisation" of transcendence, which is the idea of the one, attributeless, undivided and identical with all reality. In a later stage of its development, the Advaitic hermeneutics of all congruent statements evolved in the direction of the so-called akhaltĘaval<yartha theory of one, undivided sense of the sentence of Revelation. This theory is, as it seems now, first named and properly described in the work of Sarvajfratman entitled Saryk;epaśariraka. In the first chapter he describes the process of the interpretation of TU 2,1 tn over twenty verses, and at the very outset of his exegesis he indicates that the attributive words of this particular key-statement should be interpreted in the same manner, as the words "this" (tat) and "you" (tvam) in the ChU 6,7,8 statement "You are this". The statement from the Chandogya-Upanisad is to express the sense of identity of the transcendent Self (tvam) with transcendence (taĄ.The procedure of interpreting TU 2,1 then is to show that the sentence should evoke the sense of one9 undivided reality (akha1l]a) in us. It seems then, that this could be an indication that the appositional, attributive sentence was taken by the later Advaitin to bring about the knowledge of the identity of the transcendent Self and 278 H. Młnrpwlcz transcendence. The moment of the ręaltzation of this undivided (akhaltQa), due to the proper realtzation of the true, soteriological meaningfulness of the key-statement from TIJ 2,1, might also be considered by Sarvajfl6tman to be the moment of the realization of the lack of differentiation, primordial identity (akhaalia) of the transcendental self with transcendence. BS[Bh ChU ChUBh KV BtsLtocRApHy PRrIułny LlrpRłruRp Brahmasfitrabhasya, Śankara: Sriśańkarabhasyopetam. Sriśankar acaryagranthavali Ętiyobhaga. DillT l990 (2'd ed.). Chandogya-Upanisad: Tśadidaśopanisadah. Ten Principal l-Ipanigads with Sankarabha5ya fWorks of Sankaracarya in Original Sanskrit Volurne I]. Delhi 1992 (1" ed. 1964). Chandogyopani;adbhagya, Śankara: Samaveda's Chandogyopanishad fUpanishadbhashyam-Volume-2] with the Bhashya of Shankaracharya adorned by the commentaries of Narendra Puri and Ananda Giri and Abhinava Narayananandrena Sarasvati (for ch. 6-7-8 only). Edited with introduction, notes, etc. by S. SugRłHN4ANyA SHłsrRI. |Advaita Granthą Ratna Mafiju;a-Ratna 24]. Varanasi 1982. Kaśikavrtti, Vamana: Kaśikavltti (Commentary on the AstadhyayI of Palini) of Vamana and Jayadttya (with) Ny5sa or Pafrcika Commentary of Acarya Jinendrabuddha and Padmamaf,jara of Haradatta Miśra. Critically edited by SwłHły DwłRIrłołs SHłsrru and pt KeltxapRASAD SHurclł. Prachya Bharati Prakashan. Part II. Varanasi 1965. Advaita Vedanta NS TU TUBh TV US Hłcrgn 1951 HłLBpłss 1991 Młxttvtu-lpN 1975 Hermenęutics ofRevelationKey-Statements 279 Naigkarmyasiddhi, Sureśvara: The Nai;karmyasiddhi of Sureśvaracarya with the Candrika of Jfranottama. Sureśvara's Naiskarmyasiddhi, ed. by G.A. Jłcon, revised edition by M. HIRtyłNNA. |Bombav Sąnslo"it and Prakrit Series I{o. 38]. Bombay 1925. see : TaittirTyopanisadbha9yam Taittinya-Upanisad-Bhasya, Śankara : Shankarabhagavatpada's Upanishadbhagyam. Vol. I (for the first 8 Upanisads). With the commentaries of Anandagiricharya for a11, and in addition commentaries for Katha, Mandukya and Taittiriya by great acharyas and Taittiriyavartika of Sureshvaracharya with Commentary. Ed. with notes etc. by S. SunRAHłNA SHAstxl. |Advaita Grantha Ratną Mafij u; a-Ratn a 2Il1. Y aranast I97 9 . Taittiriyavarlika sęe : Taittiriyopanis adbhasya UpadeśasahasrI, see: Młyroe 1973 SpcoxpARy LlrpRłruRp Płul HłcrpR: (Jntersuchungen iiber Texte des friihen Advąitavada 1. Die Schtiler Śankaras. |Abhalldlung der Geistestłnd Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse 26]. Wiesbaden 1951. Wtt-Hplnł Hłt-BpłsS, Human Reason and Vedic Revelation in Advaita-Vedanta. In: HłLgpłSS, W., Tradition ąnd Reflection Explorations in Indian Thought. Albany 1991, pp. 132-204. Guy MłXIMILIEN, Za dćmonstrątion du nonagir (Naiskarmyasiddhi). Introduction et traduction par Guv MłxIMILIEN. Paris I975. 2B0 MłxllłlllpN 197516 Młypoł 1973 Młypoł 1979 Młypnł 1980-81 OgpRHłvtrłpn 1987 OgenHeN4vpn 1994 OgpnHłNaHłpn 2000 H. Młnrpwrcz Guy MłxtHłILlex, Le Langage et l'Atman d'apres USP 188 (I), WZKS 19 (1975) II7-I34. Le Langage et l'Atman d'apres USP 188 (II) IĄ/ZKS 20 (1976) I25-I37. Sankara's tJpadeśasdhasri, Critically edited with Introduction and Indices by SpNcłru MevEDA. Tokyo 1973. A Thousand Teachings. The Upadeśasahasri of Sańkara. Translated with Introduction and Notes by SrxceKu MAyEoł. Tokyo 1979. SrNcłru MłyEDł, Śankara and Sureśvara: Their Exegetical Method to Interpręt the Great Sentence 'Tąt Tvam Asi'. Advar Libł,ąl,v Bulletin lD,K. Kunjunni Raja Felicitation Volunte], Madras 1980-8 I, I47 -160. GpRHłno OeenHłN4MER, Versuch einer tt.anszendentąlen Hermeneutik religiósel" Traditionen. |PDl\rRL, Occasiollal Papers 3]. Wien Sammlung de Nobili 1987. GpnHłRn OepRHłvMER, Lą deliverance, dćs cette vie (jivanmukti). |Publications de l'Institttt de Civilisation Indienne, Sćrie in-B, Fąscicule 61]. Paris : College de France 1994. GpRHłm OgpnHłN4MER, Einleitende Gedanken zum Symposion. [In iiberarbeiteter Form S. 9-34 in diesem Band unter dem Titel: Mit-sein, Mythisierung und Transzendenz. Einleitende Gedanken zum Symposion].